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PLURALIZING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
Mark A. Drumbl* 
FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FuTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE. Edited by Philippe Sands. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 192. Cloth, 
$60; paper, $21 .99. 
INTRODUCTION 
From Nuremberg to The Hague scours the institutions of 
international criminal justice in order to examine their legitimacy and 
effectiveness. This collection of essays is edited by Philippe Sands, an 
eminent authority on public international law and professor at 
University College London. 1 The five essays derive from an equal 
number of public lectures held in London between April and June 
2002. The essays - concise and in places informal - carefully avoid 
legalese and arcania. Taken together, they cover an impressive 
spectrum of issues. Read individually, however, each essay is ordered 
around one or two well-tailored themes, thereby ensuring analytic 
rigor. Consequently, the overall collection is accessible without being 
breezy. It provides an insightful contribution to a burgeoning field and 
busy debate. 
Sands has assembled an illustrious group of contributors. Two of 
the invited essays are authored by scholarly giants of international law. 
James Crawford (Whewell Professor of International Law, University 
of Cambridge, and Member of the United Nations (UN) International 
Law Commission from 1992 to 2001) sets out the negotiation process 
* Associate Professor of Law and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow, Washington & Lee 
University. B.A. 1989, M.A. 1992, McGill; J.D. 1994, University of Toronto; LL.M. 1998, 
J.S.D. 2002, Columbia. - Ed. I appreciate the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, and the research assistance of Erica Richards. 
1. Sands directs the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) Centre for 
International Courts and Tribunals at University College London. PICT engages in a 
comparative and thematic analysis of the work of courts that adjudicate international crimes 
in places as diverse as Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timar, Iraq, and 
Cambodia. Additional information on PICT's projects is available online at http://www.pict­
pcti.org. Sands also is a practicing barrister specializing in public international law litigation 
with the Matrix Chambers in London. In this capacity, he has been involved in leading cases, 
including litigation involving the former President of Chile, General Pinochet, and also 
important international environmental law disputes. 
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of the International Criminal Court, the permanent institution that 
entered into force in 2002 to adjudicate alleged perpetrators of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Andrew Clapham 
(from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva) 
thoughtfully examines how international criminal law has responded 
to the complexity of the conduct it proscribes and the reality of 
widespread public complicity in that conduct. In addition to editing 
the volume, Sands also contributes an essay. He carefully explores the 
interplay among national and international courts in punishing 
perpetrators of international crimes. The opening essay in the volume 
is by a historian, Richard Overy, who traces extant international 
criminal law back to its genesis at the Nuremberg trials. Cherie Booth, 
a well-known human rights litigator, authors the final essay in the 
volume. She discusses how international criminal justice could 
improve its response to gender violence. The involvement in the 
project of Booth - and certainly also Crawford and Sands -
diversifies the volume's content insofar as these authors have 
considerable litigation experience and, therefore, represent the voices 
of those who argue and operationalize international law in a variety 
of courts. 
In terms of readership, this edited volume obviously will interest 
theoreticians and practitioners in international, comparative, and 
criminal law. It will also intrigue scholars of jurisprudence. From 
Nuremberg to The Hague, however, also resonates outside of the legal 
academy. This is in part due to the contributors' ability to present the 
law in a lively and engaging manner. The volume generates even more 
dynamism owing to its focus, rather uncommon within the literature, 
on an interdisciplinary and victim-centered analysis. One of the 
premises of this book is that, whereas "[l]awyers are particularly 
interested in the minutiae of technical questions[,] . . .  what matters to 
most people is a bigger question: is the emerging system of 
international criminal justice fulfilling its objectives?" (p. 106) . This 
premise augments the currency of From Nuremberg to The Hague 
among those who apply sociological, anthropological, psychological, 
and social science methodologies to come to grips with mass atrocity 
and the role of justice in transcending systemic violence. 
I intend in this Review to examine the contributions and 
limitations of From Nuremberg to The Hague and, in so doing, engage 
in a sustained process of critique and reflection regarding the 
internationalization of criminal process and its application to 
individual perpetrators of collective violence. To varying degrees, each 
contributor to this volume supports this process and its 
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operationalization through international courts and tribunals, many of 
which have been created over the past decade. 2 
In this regard, the contributors write within the dominant 
metanarrative of international criminal law.3 This paradigm, which has 
gained currency since the Nuremberg trials (pp. 22, 28), casts mass 
violence as something blatantly transgressive of universal norms. 
Transgressions of this magnitude constitute extraordinary acts of 
criminality that necessitate thorough investigation, effective 
prosecution, and retributive punishment. What is more, this heuristic 
posits the need to stigmatize this behavior through special categories 
of criminality that recognize the particularly opprobrious nature of the 
crimes at hand. This, in turn, gives rise to proscriptions concerning 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and - inchoately - to 
large-scale acts of terrorism. This heuristic takes seriously Hannah 
Arendt's notion that the criminality of mass atrocity is of concern not 
just to individual victims or roiled societies but also to humanity as a 
whole and, consequently, that international institutions largely staffed 
by individuals personally disconnected from the conflict constitute 
appropriate conduits to prosecute and punish offenders and, thereby, 
effect justice.4 As Sands notes, there has been a proliferation of such 
institutions in recent years, reflecting the reality that "the 
international community has determined that the gravest crimes are 
properly the subject of criminal justice systems" (p. 71) . These 
institutions appropriate the legitimacy of punishment as practiced by 
states and reapply it in a supra-statal context to punish the "enem[ies] 
of all humankind. "5 
Assuredly, it is comfortable - and comforting - for the 
contributors to From Nuremberg to The Hague to write within this 
metanarrative. This comfort, though, also cabins the full creative 
output of the volume. What I wish to accomplish in this Review Essay 
is to build upon the insights and wisdom of the contributors to suggest 
ways - some of which at first blush may seem eccentric or 
unorthodox - through which international criminal justice might 
become more effective in making the world a safer place. 
2. Cherie Booth may be the most enthusiastic of the contributors regarding 
international criminal law institutions and the power of individualized legal process to 
transform conflict situations. Pp. 178-80. 
3. JEAN-FRAN<;OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). 
4. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL 269 (1963) (arguing that insofar as the Holocaust was a crime against humanity, it 
needed an international tribunal to do justice to it); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 241 (1958) (calling these incidents of criminality "radical evil"). 
5. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 90 
(2004). 
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I. NUREMBERG AND HAGIOGRAPHY 
As its title foreshadows, From Nuremberg to The Hague 
specifically examines the evolution of international criminal justice 
from the Second World War to the contemporary wave of legal 
institution-building that animates international relations. The preface 
equates the output of this current wave to an "emergence of a new 
system of 'international criminal law'" (p. x). Sands astutely ascribes 
the termination of the Second World War as coincident with the 
beginnings of the mainstreaming of international criminal law, 
although it is unclear whether this has reached the level of creating a 
new legal "system." Instead, perhaps, international criminal law may 
be thought of as a patchwork of loosely connected national, regional, 
international, and hybrid judicial proceedings. That said, the Preface's 
reference to a new system of international criminal law certainly is 
given momentum by the creation in 2002 of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) which, assuredly, may provide precisely the sort of 
permanent enforcement system Sands envisions.6 
Prior to the Second World War, international criminal law 
evidenced only rare - and fleeting - life signs. These included 
suggestions of international or transnational criminal process in the 
wake of the Turkish campaigns against the Armenians in 1915 and the 
tactics of the German Kaiser in his effort to secure a German victory 
over the Allies in the First World War.7 These suggestions never 
gathered much momentum. Consequently, it is fair to say that prior to 
World War II "individuals had no standing at all in international law 
and, apart from insignificant exceptions, humanitarian law had never 
been enforced. "8 
To be sure, Nuremberg was somewhat of a watershed. Although 
formally conducted within an institution called the International 
Military Tribunal, the Nuremberg proceedings essentially were 
criminal proceedings, not courts-martial.9 These proceedings were 
catalytic in "building the foundation for contemporary international 
law on war crimes" (p. 28). Nuremberg also played a pivotal role in 
discrediting the ex post facto defense: namely, that it is improper to 
prosecute someone for an act that was legal at the time and place 
where the crime was committed (p. 21). 
6. Crawford also inquires whether these new institutions, in particular the ICC, create 
an international justice "system." Pp. 145, 150. 
7. Stephan Landsman, Those Who Remember the Past May Not Be Condemned to 
Repeat It, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1566-67 (2002). 
8. Richard J. Goldstone, International Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the First 
Decade of the 21st Century, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 3, 3 (2004). 
9. Landsman, supra note 7, at 1568. 
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That said, it is important not to engage in a hagiographic treatment 
of the Nuremberg proceedings. Richard Overy's essay, in which he 
draws from his academic training as a historian, is to be credited for its 
cautiousness. Overy does not venerate the trials, but instead examines 
them with great curiosity and great care. He goes out of his way to 
identify the mindset of the architects of the Nuremberg trials at the 
time of the establishment of the Tribunal and at the time of the 
prosecution of various cases. This is refreshing as it counters the 
seductive tendency to sprinkle the past with some revisionism to make 
the past conform to contemporary understandings of how it ought 
to look. 
Although the Nuremberg proceedings were animated by rhetoric 
that evinced legalist zeal, in the end only twenty-two defendants were 
indicted (p. 12). Many suspects avoided prosecution. The involvement 
of non-German nationals in the atrocities was deliberately overlooked. 
Moreover, the initial focus of the proceedings was not on the atrocities 
perpetrated against European Jewry, but on the crime of waging an 
aggressive war. In fact, Nuremberg began not as an affirmation of the 
law of atrocity but rather as a condemnation of Nazi warmongering 
and militarism. 10 Subsequent apprehensions by the Soviet Union, 
however, regarding the criminalization of waging an aggressive war -
let us not forget the Soviet invasions of Poland and Finland -
prompted a political settlement that gave birth to a new offense, 
crimes against humanity, into which the deliberate persecution and 
murder of Jews and gypsies could be folded (p. 21). In the end, the 
indictment formally issued by the Tribunal on October 19, 1945 
included four charges: a common conspiracy to wage aggressive war, 
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Overy 
notes that "[a]t least one of the four prosecuting states, the Soviet 
Union, was guilty on three of the four counts" (p. 23). United States 
prosecutors increasingly turned to atrocity evidence to sustain the 
momentum of the trials while reassuring the Soviet Union. History has 
recorded Nuremberg to be much more about the law of atrocity than 
it actually was. 
Overy also reminds us that justice at Nuremberg was highly 
selective and abundantly politicized. He notes that 
[e]ven while the horrors of the Nazi camp system were being revealed in 
court, the Soviet authorities were setting up concentration camps in the 
Soviet zone of occupation, like the isolation camp at Miihlberg on the 
Elbe, where, out of 122,000 prisoners who were sent without trial to the 
camp, over 43,000 were killed or died (pp. 25-26). 
10. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY 
IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 93 (2001) (noting also that the main evidentiary focus 
was Nazi aggression and not the plight of victims of atrocities). 
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The political need to prevent exposing the Soviet Union as an 
international pariah sparked a legal process that limited guilt to the 
German nation and, within this nation, placed responsibility upon the 
shoulders of a handful of notorious individuals. 
Moreover, it is telling that the title of this volume refers only to 
Nuremberg and not to its companion institution, the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (colloquially referred to as the 
Tokyo Tribunal).11 Whereas some legalism did trickle into Nuremberg, 
the Tokyo Tribunal was "fraught with procedural irregularities and 
marred by abuses of judicial discretion."12 The proceedings were 
abundantly politicized in a much more blatant manner than at 
Nuremberg. By 1953 most of the Tokyo Tribunal's convicts had been 
quietly released. What is more, by 1954 "two of the major war 
criminals [it] convicted . . .  became the prime minister and the minister 
of foreign affairs of Japan. "13 
In the ensuring decades, international criminal law mostly endured 
as the preserve of a small group of academics and international 
lawyers as the Cold War stymied efforts to move international 
criminal law into the agora of international politics. Principally, the 
Cold War triggered a sclerosis at the Security Council that hampered 
efforts at international criminal law-making.14 The thawing of the Cold 
War, however, led to a renaissance characterized by the "startling 
growth of efforts to establish a worldwide criminal process capable of 
punishing heinous crimes ranging from genocide to grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions."15 More important, even, is the channeling 
of this growth into a proliferation of brick-and-mortar institutions that 
exercise jurisdiction over individuals. These include purely 
international courts - such as the ICC16 - and ad hoc tribunals for 
11 .  The essays only make scattered reference to the Tokyo Tribunals. Clapham raises 
the fact that the Tokyo Tribunal, in some contrast to the Nuremberg Tribunal, did not deal 
with issues of criminal organizations or the responsibility of Japanese industrialists. P. 41. 
12. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY 103 (2004 ). 
13. Id. at 106. 
14. Crawford notes that, at the end of the Cold War, "[t]here had been no experience of 
the international administration of criminal justice since the 1940s." P. 124. 
15. Landsman, supra note 7, at 1565. 
16. For Overy, "[t]he International Criminal Court . . .  is a direct descendant of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal." Pp. 28-29. Booth remarks that "[t]he ICC is part of a 
continuum, a process that was catalysed in Nuremberg." P. 191. The ICC, which entered into 
force on July l, 2002, was created by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF.18319* (1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/ law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It is 
a permanent institution mandated to investigate and prosecute the most serious crimes of 
international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Id. arts. 1, 
4-8. At the time of writing, ninety-seven nations have become parties to (and 139 nations 
have signed) the Rome Statute. See Ratification Status, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
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Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR)17 and 
the former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, ICTY).18 Brick-and-mortar institutions also include what 
Sands calls "internationalised national courts," (p. 73) such as the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone19 and hybrid (UN/domestic) panels or 
chambers in Kosovo,20 East Timor,21 and Cambodia.22 
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatylO.asp (last visited June 11, 
2004). 
17. The !CTR was established as an ad hoc institution by the Security Council. See 
Statute of the !CTR, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/955 (1994). The !CTR investigates and prosecutes persons responsible for genocide 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian Jaw committed in the territory of 
Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
committed in the territory of neighboring states, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 
1994. Id. para. 1. 
18. The ICTY, another ad hoc institution of the Security Council, investigates and 
prosecutes persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian Jaw 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. See Statute of the ICTY, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), 
para. 2. 
19. The Sierra Leone Special Court (opened on March 10, 2004) was established jointly 
by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to prosecute those with greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian Jaw and Sierra Leonean 
Jaw committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. See Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html (last 
visited June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1315 (2000), adopted at the 4186th mtg. (Aug. 14, 2000). 
20. Special panels within the Kosovo legal system mix international and national judges 
and prosecutors. See United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Regulation 
2000/64 of 15 December 2000. These special panels adjudicate a variety of crimes committed 
from May 1998 to June 1999 in the course of the armed conflict between Kosovo separatists 
and the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but they do not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over such crimes. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN 
EUROPE MISSION IN Kosovo, KOSOVO'S WAR CRIMES TRIALS: A REVIEW 9 (Sept. 2002). 
21. Courts have been organized in East Timor with the assistance of the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET Regulation 2000/11 
(2000), as amended by UNTAET Regulation 2001125 (2001) . One District Court, located in 
Dili, has two Special Panels for Serious Crimes with exclusive jurisdiction over "serious 
criminal offenses," namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual 
offenses, and torture committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999, when pro­
Indonesian militias rampaged throughout East Timor after the region voted for 
independence from Indonesia. Id. art. 9; UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, On the 
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences (2000), s. 
1.3; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS lNT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 157, 195 (2004). 
22. G.A. Res. 57/223, NRES/57/228 B (2003), Khmer Rouge Trials, Annex Draft 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia. From 1975 
to 1979, the Khmer Rouge massacred approximately 1.7 million Cambodians. The 
Cambodia-UN agreement contemplates the formation of extraordinary legal chambers in 
the Cambodian judicial system to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders and others most 
responsible for serious violations of Cambodian penal Jaw, international humanitarian law 
and custom (including genocide), and international conventions recognized by Cambodia 
committed during the period April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979. It remains unclear if and 
when these extraordinary chambers actually will begin to hear cases. 
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Although each of these institutions formally is independent from 
the others, James Crawford (pp. 109-156) demonstrates how they draw 
strength from each other and weave together to form the tapestry of 
international criminal law. Whether this tapestry rises to the level of a 
formalized system, however, is a thorny question. The question is all 
the more complex because of the need to separate systematization on 
an institutional level from systematization on a doctrinal level. 
Institutionally speaking, international criminal tribunals operate with 
some degree of independence, although they remain firmly dependent 
on national political systems to capture suspects, provide witnesses, 
and incarcerate convicts. This limited institutional independence is 
tempered by a deeply embedded theoretical dependence. As I shall 
explore further in Part III, international criminal justice has not yet 
developed a free-standing theoretical framework. Although 
international criminal law has made great strides in conceptualizing 
the behavior it criminalizes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes), it has struggled to develop independent approaches to 
determine the guilt of defendants, punish convicts, and narrate 
historical tragedies. In all three of these important areas, international 
criminal law depends on the often contested modalities of national 
criminal law. These embedded dependencies, along with some 
circumspection regarding the role of law in expiating hatred generally, 
suggest that the need for vigilance in venerating the Nuremberg 
Tribunal also applies to each of the institutions it has spawned. For the 
international lawyer, modesty about what the law can accomplish is an 
important virtue. In this vein, Sands is wise to remind us that 
"[c]riminal law in general - and international law in particular - will 
never be a panacea for the ills of the world" (p. 71).  
II. INDIVIDUAL GUILT, ORGANIC CRIME, AND PU RIFICATION 
THROUGH LAW 
The international criminal tribunals strongly have emphasized that 
the extraordinary nature of atrocity crimes justifies the need for these 
crimes to be adjudicated by international institutions. For example, in 
an interlocutory ruling in the Tadic case, the ICTY warned of the 
"perennial danger" that international crimes might be characterized as 
ordinary crimes and cited this danger as justifying the primacy of the 
ICTY over national courts.23 Despite the extraordinary nature of the 
criminality of mass atrocity, however, the approach of the 
international criminal tribunals to punishment and the process of 
determining guilt or innocence remains rather ordinary, and perhaps 
23. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 58 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995). 
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even staid. Under the extant heuristic of international criminal law, 
accountability arises from third-party adjudication in a trial setting24 
followed by incarceration. This means that the methodology of 
international criminal law largely replicates methods of prosecution 
and punishment dominant within those states that dominate the 
international political order.25 To be sure, international criminal law 
has developed its own institutions and rules.26 These, as Crawford 
details, are the product of considerable hard work and diplomatic 
maneuvering (pp. 135-37) .  I posit, however, that although these 
institutions and their rules may be formally distinct from national 
systems, they are not substantively distinct.27 Nor are they distinct 
24. The ICTY and ICTR adhere to an adversarial Anglo-American model of 
adjudication. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LA w OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 6 (2003). The ICC, reflecting the fact it developed 
through an internationally negotiated treaty, is more of a balance between the adversarial 
approach and the inquisitorial approach preferred by the civil law. See id. at 10-11, 160. That 
said, both approaches prioritize retributive, punitive, and individualized justice applied 
through the incapacitation of the offender. Although international criminal justice 
institutions may have harmonized adversarial and inquisitorial methodologies, this 
harmonization is a political settlement among powerful international actors. It is not a 
genuinely inclusive process that accommodates the disempowered victims of mass violence 
- largely from non-Western audiences and often estranged from any state or government 
- who consistently lack any clout in international relations. 
25. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2003) (arguing 
that international criminal law results from the "transposition on to the international level of 
rules and legal constructs proper to national criminal law or to national trial proceedings"); 
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2003) 
(asserting that the goals of international criminal law are an extension of the goals of 
national criminal law). 
26. See, e.g. , Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-1, para. 22 (!CTR 
Trial Chamber, July 15, 2004) ("[T]he Chamber is not bound by national rules of evidence, 
but by its own Rules. Where the Rules are silent, the Chamber is to apply rules of evidence 
which best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and which are consonant with 
the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law."). For a discussion of the law of 
evidence in the international criminal tribunals, see 2 JUDGE RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE 
WIERDA, INTERN A TI ON AL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2002). 
27. Crawford discusses the choice the architects of the ICC had to make regarding how 
to frame the system of international criminal justice. According to Crawford: 
[I]t was possible to envisage two broad solutions. One was essentially a procedural solution. 
The ICC would in effect borrow its legitimacy from a national system or systems of 
international criminal justice, acting as surrogate for these, exercising their jurisdiction and 
applying their substantive law to the extent that the limited rules of international criminal 
law did not cover some question. The second solution was to establish, from the beginning, 
an essentially autonomous international criminal justice system, with its own institutions and 
rules, essentially distinct from national systems and dependent on them only for co­
operation and enforcement. 
Pp. 135-36. 
For Crawford, the ICC represents "the move from the first to the second model." P. 137; 
see also p. 154. I agree with Crawford about the importance of making this move. I part 
company with him, however, regarding the scope of movement that has thus far taken place. 
Although some movement may be afoot, in my mind international criminal justice still has a 
very Jong way to go before it can claim autonomous and distinct status. At present, the ICC, 
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from the theory that underpins dominant national criminal law 
systems, thereby lending credence to Cherif Bassiouni's construction 
of international criminal law as essentially reactive to tragedy, instead 
of proactive and doctrinally self-supporting.28 
There is, of course, lively debate regarding the suitability of 
dominant methods of punishment in the ordinary domestic context. 
The proponents of these new international institutions avoid this 
debate, however, and simply apply these same methods to the context 
of mass atrocity. In this sense, scholars of international criminal law 
expend little effort in connecting with scholars critical of criminal law. 
Assuredly, there are very few international legal scholars sufficiently 
zealous to believe that criminal trials should be the only response to 
mass atrocity. That said, there are many scholars who ascribe 
considerable transformative potential to these trials.29 This potential 
echoes in other intellectual constituencies.30 Moreover, the community 
of international human rights activists supports the expansion of the 
international criminal justice paradigm. So, too, do many political 
actors, including states, international organizations (for example, the 
UN), and nongovernmental entities. 
From Nuremberg to The Hague largely shares this enthusiasm for 
law. Its criticisms of the extant project of international criminal justice, 
although insightful, are not structural. While the volume is enriched by 
its invocation of historical and feminist perspectives, it - with one 
exception - does not incorporate much in the way of critical 
criminology. This exception is Andrew Clapham, whose contribution 
to From Nuremberg to The Hague is the most piercing. 
Clapham's thesis is that massive crimes involve levels of 
complexity (pp. 31-50) and complicity (pp. 50-62) that are alien to 
domestic criminal law. For Clapham, "simple rules attributing conduct 
to single actors fail to capture the complexity of the phenomena . . .  " 
(pp. 50-51; emphasis omitted). Clapham's response is modest insofar 
as it operates within the paradigm of individual criminal responsibility. 
Essentially, he aspires for individual criminal responsibility to be more 
together with all of the institutions punishing extraordinary criminality, does not yet bring an 
autonomous doctrinal framework to punishing perpetrators of mass violence. 
28. BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at xxxii, xxxvi, 583, 588. 
29. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Review Essay, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 712 (2003) (noting 
"the euphoria surrounding the ICC's establishment"); Nehal Bhuta, Review Essay, 27 MELB. 
U. L. R. 255, 256 (2003) (book review) ("[I]nternational lawyers' enthusiasm for the concept 
of international criminal law has only increased . . . .  '[I]nternational justice' at times appears 
in danger of becoming a panacea for the problems of contemporary international order, 
allegedly fulfilling a cornucopia of objectives . . . .  "). 
30. John M. Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the 
International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 62 (2003) (noting that "faith in 
the ICC . . .  is held quite strongly in Western intellectual circles"). 
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aggressively asserted against a greater number of individuals.31 
This is, so to speak, a "widening of the net" (p. 62). One way to 
widen the net is to call on theories of individual culpability that 
take into account the role of collective action. Recent jurisprudence 
from the ICTR and ICTY has invoked collective liability theories 
along these lines to ground convictions for atrocities in Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia.32 These theories specifically include joint 
criminal enterprise, conspiracy, complicity, command responsibility, 
and incitement. 
The Niyitegeka judgment is illustrative.33 Eliezer Niyitegeka, a 
journalist and newscaster on Radio Rwanda, was appointed Minister 
of Information in the genocidal government that assumed power in 
April 1994.34 The ICTR convicted him on a variety of counts, including 
conspiracy to commit genocide. The ICTR ruled that the existence of 
a conspiracy and the specific intent to commit genocide among the 
conspirators could be established circumstantially. In this case, the 
ICTR considered a variety of testimonial and documentary evidence 
as germane to proof of the specific intent to commit genocide.35 In 
terms of proving the existence of a conspiracy, the ICTR held that the 
"organized manner in which the attacks were carried out . . .  
presupposes the existence of a plan."36 
31. Pp. 58, 67. "We can hope that this wide net of accountability, covering not only 
people in positions of authority but also those who simply aid and abet others, should serve 
to prevent crimes as people alter their conduct to avoid liability." P. 67. 
32. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Apr. 19, 2004) 
(convicting defendant of aiding and abetting genocide and substituting that for a conviction 
at trial as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide); Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, Dec. 3, 2003) (convicting three 
defendants for Conspiracy to Commit Genocide and Direct and Public Incitement of 
Genocide through the media); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T (ICTR Trial 
Chamber, May 15, 2003) (convicting defendant of Complicity in Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity and sentencing him to twenty-five years' imprisonment); Prosecutor v. 
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A (ICTR Appeals Chamber, Nov. 16, 2001) (convicting 
director of a tea factory of genocide based on command responsibility and sentencing him to 
life imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 220 (ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, July 15, 1999) (holding that intent in joint criminal enterprise liability can be 
shown directly or "as a matter of inference from the nature of the accused's authority within 
the . . .  organizational hierarchy"). 
· 
33. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15, 
2003) (convicting defendant on a number of charges, including conspiracy to commit 
genocide, and sentencing him to life imprisonment), affd, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A (ITCR 
Appeals Chamber, July 19, 2004). 
34. Id. para. 2. 
35. This includes evidence regarding Niyitegeka's participation in and attendance at 
meetings, planning of attacks, distribution of weapons to attackers, expression of support of 
the Rwandan Prime Minister, actions or inactions in failing to protect the victimized Tutsi 
population, and his general leadership role. Id. para. 427. 
36. Id. para. 428. It also was held that Niyitegeka had "sketched a plan for an attack." 
Id. 
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In another case, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, a different ICTR Trial 
Chamber explicitly relied on the Niyitegeka decision in support of the 
propriety of inferring an agreement to commit conspiracy to commit 
genocide from circumstantial evidence.37 In that decision, it was 
additionally held that such an agreement "can be inferred from 
coordinated actions by individuals who have a common purpose and 
are acting within a unified framework."38 Assuredly, this alone is not 
an expansive reading of conspiracy as a basis for liability.39 The ICTR, 
however, went on to note that 
[a] coalition, even an informal coalition, can constitute such a framework 
so long as those acting within the coalition are aware of its existence, 
their participation in it, and its role in furtherance of their common 
purpose . . . .  [C]onspiracy to commit genocide can be comprised of 
individuals acting in an institutional capacity .. . independently of their 
personal links with each other. 40 
In sum, conspiracy as a basis for culpability has become 
less controversial than it initially was when boldly introduced 
at Nuremberg.41 
Interestingly, though, the ICTY has begun to express some 
concern with the expansive use of collective liability theories to 
ground individual criminal responsibility as a direct participant. On 
July 24, 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed sixteen of the 
nineteen convictions previously entered by an ICTY Trial Chamber 
against Bosnian Croat military officer Tihomir Blaskic for ordering 
crimes against Muslim civilians and for failing as a commander to 
prevent the commission of those crimes.42 The Appeals Chamber 
expressed concern with elements of vicarious liability that apparently 
had informed the Trial Chamber's interpretation of ordering and 
command responsibility.43 Instead, the Appeals Chamber emphasized 
37. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, para. 1046. 
38. Id. para.1047. 
39. Cf United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
904 (1974). 
40. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, paras. 1047-48. 
41. Overy does a masterful job at setting out this controversy. Pp. 14-18, 28. Whereas 
conspiracy enjoys considerable legitimacy within the Anglo-American common law, many 
civil law jurisdictions remain somewhat inhospitable to criminal conviction based on 
conspiracy. 
42. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, July 29, 
2004). 
43. See also Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 455, 456 (2001) ("Generally speaking, international criminal law on [command 
responsibility] seems to be somewhat more hospitable to notions of vicarious liability and 
other legal constructs which, in their practical application - if not already in their 
formulation - display a measure of insensitivity to the degree of the actor's own personal 
culpability."). 
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the need for the prosecutor to prove subjective awareness (or, at a 
minimum, recklessness) to secure a conviction.44 Moreover, in the 
September 1,  2004, decision in Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, an ICTY Trial 
Chamber rejected joint criminal enterprise in a case with an 
extraordinarily broad nature and in which the accused was physically 
and structurally remote from the crimes.45 
What is more, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also recently 
overturned the conviction of General Krstic, a General-Major in the 
Bosnian Serb army at the time it massacred 7000 to 8000 Bosnian 
Muslim men in the UN safe-haven of Srebrenica.46 Initially, an ICTY 
Trial Chamber had convicted Krstic as a primary perpetrator based on 
joint criminal enterprise. In the earlier Tadic decision, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber had held that joint criminal enterprise is an 
extended form of individual criminal responsibility that "embraces 
actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a 
common criminal design."47 In the trial decision in Krstic, the ICTY 
noted that genocidal intent could be inferred circumstantially from 
44. Regarding ordering, the Appeals Chamber held that "a person who orders an act or 
omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in 
the execution of that order [] has the requisite mens rea for establishing liability . . . .  " 
Blaski{;, Case No. IT-95-14-A, paras. 42, 166. For the Appeals Chamber, "[t]he knowledge of 
any kind of risk [that violations would occur], however low, does not suffice for the 
imposition of criminal responsibility . . . .  [U]nder the Trial Chamber's standard, any military 
commander who issues an order would be criminally responsible, because there is always a 
possibility that violations could occur." Id. para. 41 .  Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber 
criticized the understanding of command responsibility adopted by the Trial Chamber, 
affirming instead a different understanding, according to which "a superior will be criminally 
responsible through the principles of superior responsibility only if information was 
available to him which would have put him on notice of offences committed by 
subordinates." Id. para. 62 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also para. 406. 
45. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, Sept. 1, 2004). 
The Trial Chamber also held that, although genocidal intent may be inferred 
circumstantially, in cases where direct evidence is absent, the inference of intent must be the 
only reasonable inference available. Id. 
46. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 2 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Apr. 
19. 2004). 
47. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 193 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, July 
15, 1999). All participants in a joint criminal enterprise are equally guilty of the crime 
regardless of their individual roles in its commission. The ICTY has defined a joint criminal 
enterJ?rise as 
an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between two or more persons 
that they will commit a crime. The understanding or arrangement need not be express, and 
its existence may be inferred from all the circumstances. It need not have been reached at 
any time before the crime is committed. The circumstances in which two or more persons are 
participating together in the commission of a particular crime may themselves establish an 
unspoken understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement formed between them 
then and there to commit that crime. 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, para. 80 (ICTY Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 15, 2002), this conclusion aff d, Case No. IT-97-25-A (ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, Sept. 17, 2003). 
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proof that Krstic was aware of the genocidal intent of other members 
of the Bosnian Serb Army but did nothing to prevent the use of army 
resources and personnel under his command to facilitate the killings.48 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber held that a conviction for genocide only 
can be entered where the specific intent of genocide unequivocally 
has been established.49 In the case of a joint criminal enterprise, that 
intent must be shared by the co-perpetrators. By holding that Krstic 
did not possess the requisite genocidal intent, the ICTY set some 
boundaries around the potentially broad scope of joint criminal 
enterprise announced in Tadic. This finding, however, only relieved 
Krstic from conviction as a principal perpetrator of genocide based on 
his direct involvement in a joint criminal enterprise. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber instead substituted a conviction for aiding and 
abetting genocide - which it deemed to reflect a less serious level of 
criminal responsibility - and sentenced Krstic to thirty-five years' 
imprisonment, rather than his previous sentence of forty-six years.50 
Consequently, and notwithstanding its circumspection, the ICTY 
continues to convict based on collective-liability theories that, to some 
extent, tinker with traditional understandings of individual criminal 
culpability in order to suit this culpability to the special context of 
mass atrocity.51 After all, the Appeals Chamber did recognize that 
"there was no evidence that Krstic ordered any of these murders, or 
that he directly participated in them. All the evidence can establish is 
that he knew that those murders were occurring and that he permitted 
the Main Staff to use personnel and resources under his command to 
facilitate them. "52 
48. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, paras. 42, 83. 
49. Id. para. 134. 
50. Id. paras. 237, 275. The ICTR also has convicted for genocide based on secondary 
involvement as an aider and abettor. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-1 
(ICTR Trial Chamber, July 14, 2004). 
51. For example, in the Vasiljevic case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber convicted a 
defendant of persecution on a theory of aiding and abetting even though no principal 
perpetrator was on trial and even though two alleged co-perpetrators remained unidentified. 
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, para. 102 (ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, Feb. 25, 2004). Blaskic was not convicted of aiding and abetting war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, but this was not because of substantive interpretation of the scope 
of aiding and abetting. Instead, the Blaskic Appeals Chamber did not consider the issue 
because the claim was insufficiently litigated on appeal and not fairly encompassed in the 
indictment. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, para. 52 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
July 29, 2004); see also Damaska, supra note 43, at 461 (discussing the ICTY position on 
complicity as one in which "no causal link needs to be proven between a superior's act of 
assistance and the crime committed by subordinates" (citation omitted)). 
52 Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 144. Although the Appeals Chamber came to 
these conclusions specifically in regard to KrstiC's commission of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, they are indicative of the genocide charges as well. 
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Assuredly, this more generous use of conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting is understandable given the need to adapt the essentially 
stringent modalities of proof under the ordinary criminal law to the 
different context of mass atrocity, where gangs maul groups of victims 
and where survivors hide in ceilings, latrines, and under dead bodies, 
often for weeks at a time. In this inferno, exactly documenting which 
militant murdered which specific victim at what time of the day 
through corroborated eye-witness testimony - the ideal-type of the 
modern law of evidence - simply is unrealistic.53 The use of forensic 
evidence to personalize death amid the anonymity of mass graves 
presents immense challenges. What is more, most postconflict 
societies lack the resources and technology to safeguard whatever 
evidence is preserved and analyzed. Viewed through the prism of 
these realities, recourse to generous - and at times somewhat 
vicarious - liability theories becomes eminently understandable 
insofar as these theories permit the tribunals to ascribe individual guilt 
in cases where violence has several, and often murky, organic sources. 
I certainly share Clapham's hope that this broader ascription of 
individual responsibility will serve a deterrent effect (p. 67). As I see 
it, however, the adaptation of the paradigm of individual guilt to the 
cauldron of collective violence that has gained currency with the 
international criminal tribunals is much more form than substance. 
Although this adaptation may, for Clapham, amount to a "new way[] 
of thinking about the prosecution of violations of international 
crimes" (p. 66), it is really just a "new way" in a very modest sense. 
Truly recognizing the riddle of collective action requires more than 
just an extension of the dominant discourse of ordinary criminal law, 
which embraces liberalism's understanding of the individual as the 
central unit of action and thereby deserving of blame when things go 
terribly wrong. 54 This understanding echoes one of the most famous 
legacies of Nuremberg, namely the Tribunal's pronouncement that 
"[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."55 This 
predicate carries through to modern institutions of international 
53. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-1 para. 27; BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at 633-
34. 
54. BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at 685. 
55. Pp. 32-33. Despite this bold pronouncement, the Nuremberg Tribunal did engage in 
some ascription of collective liability. For example, Clapham points out that it did declare 
certain organizations, including the Nazi Party and the Gestapo, to be criminal 
organizations. P. 34. Moreover, the trials were held collectively. 
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criminal justice, including the ICC, which only can try individuals.56 
The complication, however, is that criminal law systems focused on 
individual responsibility may be ill-suited to promote accountability 
for collective wrongdoing. There is a schizophrenia, one which 
emerges tellingly in the Blaskic proceedings: these systems incorporate 
vicarious legal elements in order to secure convictions, but 
then express concern that criminalization ought not be based on 
vicarious liability. 
One response might be for the law of atrocity to consider 
redressing collective violence through collective modalities of 
accountability. That said, international criminal law's reification of 
individual responsibility reflects a fear of collective responsibility, 
collective blame, and, especially, collective guilt. This fear ought to be 
reappraised dispassionately, by recognizing the specific nature of mass 
atrocity and differentiating it from ordinary criminal liability. Given 
the unique nature of the extraordinary criminality of mass atrocity, 
shouldn't this criminality be addressed through a unique and 
independent doctrinal and theoretical framework? I have elsewhere 
called for the law of atrocity to build its own penology, criminology, 
and victimology.57 The absence of an independent theoretical 
framework obliges international criminal law to invoke the rationales 
of domestic criminal law. This invocation may be convenient, but it 
comes with a price: namely, such a system glosses over the fact that the 
perpetrator of mass atrocity is qualitatively different than the 
perpetrator of ordinary crime. Whereas ordinary criminals tend to 
deviate from mainstream society when they commit crimes,58 those 
individuals who perpetrate the extraordinary crimes that collectively 
lead to mass atrocity are not so deviant in the times and places in 
56. P. 48. Under the ICC, "[i)t will not be possible to bring cases against states, nor will 
there be cases against political organizations or companies." P. 48. 
57. Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539 (forthcoming 2005). 
58. There are certain ordinary crimes that may not be so starkly deviant and, 
consequently, not so clearly distinguishable from extraordinary international crimes. For 
example, organized crime, hate crime, and gang activity may occur in social conditions that 
loosely parallel those found in conflict societies. Perpetrators of these offenses may not 
perceive themselves as deviant and may in fact not deviate measurably from codes of 
conduct prevalent within their self-identified social community. They may well be 
conforming to these codes. That said, there are stark differences between these social 
communities and those societies entirely afflicted by the breakdown and remobilization that 
are conditions precedent to systemic violence. In these societies, national leaders, courts, 
laws, and bureaucracies may legalize the violence and, instead of punishing individual 
perpetrators, may actually encourage their behavior. This means that murder, torture, and 
sexual assault deviate less from mainstream norms in these societies than they would from 
norms in societies with violent or criminal sub-cultures. However, in terms of those areas of 
domestic activity where individual deviance may be obfuscated by group order, I certainly 
welcome criminological, preventative, and penological doctrine that recognizes the influence 
of the group as a social agent and the structural nature of criminogenic conditions. 
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question. There is  a deep contradiction in their behavior: although 
they transgress a jus co gens norm, this transgression often results from 
adhesion to a social norm that is much closer to home.59 This deep 
complicity cascade does not diminish the brutality or exculpate the 
aggressor, but it implicates, and in many ways problematizes, a variety 
of important issues. These include bystander innocence, reparations 
for victims, reconciliation, groupthink, reintegration of offenders, and 
the dual role of the international community as enabler of violence 
and as arbiter of right or wrong. 
Violence would not reach epidemic proportions without support 
from the masses. Whereas Clapham might respond to this through 
more expansive individual criminal liability, Cherie Booth espouses an 
even more traditionalist approach tightly connected to Nuremberg. 
Booth would narrow criminal liability only to those deemed most 
responsible so as to deliberately avoid the perception of "collective 
responsibility" (p. 184). The assumption, however, that a handful of 
people are to be blamed for the mass murder of hundreds of 
thousands may not be a realistic appraisal of life within societies 
engulfed by violent cataclysm. Although that handful certainly 
may be the most blameworthy, this does not mean that everyone else 
is innocent. 
Rwanda presents a particularly telling example. From April to July 
1994, a government comprised of extremist members of the Hutu 
ethnic group initiated a populist genocide in which 800,000 Rwandans 
(approximately ten percent of the national population) were 
murdered.60 The victims were overwhelmingly from the Tutsi ethnic 
group. In July 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military 
wing of a then extraterritorially based Tutsi political party called the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda. The RPA ousted 
the genocidal government, placed the RPF in power, and largely 
quelled the genocide. 
The speed, intensity, and rapidity of the Rwandan genocide was 
nearly triple that of the Nazi Holocaust.61 It is estimated that upwards 
of one million persons (a staggeringly high number among a national 
population of seven to eight million) were involved as perpetrators in 
the genocide: some physically doing the killing, others as accomplices, 
59. Jus cogens are the array of peremptory norms applicable to all states from which no 
derogation is possible. 
60. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 261, 264-65 
(rev. ed. 1997). 
61. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 4 (1998). 
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facilitators, and aiders and abettors.62 In Rwanda, killing became a 
civic duty enthusiastically put into place by broad swaths of the 
population. The violence was not anarchic; it arose from the conscious 
implementation of a shared social norm, according to which "[t]he 
government, and an astounding number of its subjects, imagined that 
by exterminating the Tutsi people they could make the world a better 
place."63 To these killers and their accomplices must be added the 
millions of other Rwandans who silently acquiesced to the killings. 
After all, there was nothing secret about these killings; they were 
committed publicly, with butchered bodies piled up in every 
neighborhood throughout the country. No one could have been 
oblivious to them. That said, many people averted their gaze: some 
out of fear of recrimination, others because they did not object, and 
many more because they supported the extirpation. 
In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, there has been considerable 
reliance on national and international trials to pursue a myriad of 
goals, including accountability, peace, reconciliation, and truth-telling. 
The international proceedings held at the ICTR operationalize the 
premise of selective, individualized, retributive criminal justice that 
underpins international criminal law. The ICTR was established by 
the UN Security Council on November 8, 1994 to investigate and 
prosecute political, military, and civic leaders for their involvement in 
the genocide.64 All told, as of mid-2004 the ICTR has arrested sixty-six 
individuals on charges of individual criminal responsibility (for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) for the Rwandan 
atrocity65 and has issued twenty convictions.66 There have been three 
acquittals (two of which remain subject to appeal). Given the ICTR's 
annual budget of $180 million,67 this breaks down to an average cost of 
nearly $80 million for each individual defendant for whom a trial 
verdict has been issued. Rwandan authorities and national prosecutors 
62. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in 
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1250 (2000). 
63. GOUREVITCH, supra note 61, at 6. 
64. See Statute of the ICTR, supra note 17, arts. 2-4. Ironically, Rwanda was the only 
member of the Security Council not to support the creation of the ICTR. Rwanda objected 
to the limited temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR and the fact that it cannot issue a death 
sentence. On February 22, 1995, the Security Council resolved that the ICTR would be 
based in Arusha, a city in northern Tanzania. This, too, was of concern to the Rwandan 
government, which understandably would have preferred that the tribunal be sited in 
Rwanda. 
65. /CTR Detainees - Status on 20 September 2004, at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/ 
factsheets/detainee.htm (Sept. 20, 2004). 
66. Id. 
67. G�rald Gahima, Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Comments to the Fifth Biennial 
Conference of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (June 7-10, 2003) 
(transcript on file with the author). 
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have interceded in an attempt to broaden the circle of accountability, 
arresting another 130,000 individuals. This is a significant number of 
detainees. Poor infra�tructure, lack of funding from donor states, turf 
battles with the ICTR, and fairly routine criticism from the 
international community regarding the integration of international 
due process norms all have hampered the effectiveness (not to 
mention the occurrences) of domestic trials for these detainees. Thus 
far, estimates suggest that from 6500 to 8000 such trials have been 
held.68 The Rwandan government now is turning to traditional dispute 
resolution (called gacaca) to determine wrongdoing with a view to 
reintegrating offenders. The decision to subject persons accused of 
genocide to gacaca has prompted withering criticism from 
international human rights activists and considerable reserve on the 
part of the international community.69 
The deliberate choice by international criminal justice institutions 
to selectively blame a handful of individuals for mass violence also 
may serve selfish purposes. Pinning responsibility on a few erases not 
only the involvement of ordinary Rwandans, but also the involvement 
of the international community in the violence. The ICTR's judicial 
reductionism absolves the role of international agencies, transnational 
economic processes, the foreign policies of influential states, and 
colonial policies, each of which exacerbated ethnic conflict by creating 
an environment conducive to violence in Rwanda. It also glosses over 
decisions by foreign states to ignore the violence after it had begun,70 
and the international community's failure adequately to support 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement.71 
It may be convenient to place blame for mass violence on selected 
savage individuals, instead of offering a fuller - and much more 
68. BBC News, Mass Genocide Verdict Delivered, Aug. 1, 2003 (on file with the author); 
Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 223 (2003); 18 Sentenced to Death in Rwanda in 2003 -
Amnesty, Hirondelle News Agency (Lausanne), May 31, 2004 (on file with the author). The 
!CTR has announced that in 2005 it will begin transferring cases to national courts, including 
Rwandan courts; up to forty-one cases may be considered for potential transfer. Completion 
Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Apr. 26, 2004), paras. 4-7, 
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/ completionstrat/s-2004-341.pdf. Talk of transfer 
is motivated by the ICTR's financial difficulties and impending deadlines for the completion 
of trials and appeals, and not by a framework of reference that suggests that holding these 
trials at the national level would be more effective in attaining the goals posited for these 
trials. JCTR to Refer 45 Cases to Rwanda, MONITOR (KAMPALA), Aug. 19, 2004, available at 
http:l/allafrica.com/stories/200408180472.html. 
69. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE, Rep. 
AFR 47/10/00 (2000). 
70. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE (2002). 
71 .  ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 79 (2003). 
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embarrassing - display of the multiple political, economic, historical, 
and colonial factors that facilitate violence. The trade-off for this 
convenience, though, is a narrower breadth of justice and a 
compromised preventative strategy. By virtue of its leaving the acts 
and omissions of international agents untouched, international 
criminal law fails to allocate blame according to degrees of 
responsibility. This, in turn, leads to a retributive shortfall, insofar as 
only a few people receive their just deserts while many powerful states 
and organizations avoid accountability. 
Even more frustrating is the seeming inability of ex post legal 
sanction to prod the UN - or influential states - toward taking 
assertive ex ante preventative measures. A telling example is that, on 
the ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, massive human 
rights violations rage in Darfur, Sudan, precipitating the deaths of at 
least 30,000 civilians and foretelling an imminent humanitarian 
disaster.72 Although the UN has warned of this catastrophe, it has 
procrastinated in taking more direct action.73 The UN largely is an 
agent of the political will of influential states, so this piddling can 
directly be traced back to some of those states. There is a painful 
similarity between the initial response of the international community 
to the Darfur crisis and the 1994 crisis in Rwanda. For example, there 
has been considerable legalistic debate over whether black Africans in 
72. UN and US Warn that Huge Toll in Darfur Crisis is Now Inevitable, Agence France­
Presse, June 3, 2004 (on file with the author); Emily Wax, 'A Big Sheik' Denies Crisis in 
Darfur, WASH . POST, July 18, 2004, at Al (reporting that 1.2 million people have been 
displaced from Darfur by militia violence that has killed another 30,000). 
73. Eric Reeves, Genocide in Sudan, THESE TIMES, May 6, 2004, at 16, 22 (reporting 
that "[U.N. Secretary-General] Annan has yet to make concrete proposals for either the 
resources or the mandate that would guide an intervention. The U.N.'s failure to act ensures 
that hundreds of thousands of Darfurians will die in the corning months."); Wax, supra note 
72 (reporting that the United States has urged the Sudanese government to disarm the 
militia but that militia leaders continue to roam free). On June 11,  2004, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution that "urged an immediate halt to violence in Darfur" but that did not 
propose any concrete action. UN Approves Peacekeeping Operation in Sudan, GLOBE & 
MAIL, June 11 ,  2004. On July 30, 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1556, which 
requested the Sudanese government to disarm and prosecute rampaging militia but only 
went so far as to state that it would "consider further actions" in the event the Sudanese 
government failed to do so. A draft of Resolution 1556 provided for sanctions in the event of 
Sudanese noncompliance, but seven of the fifteen members of the Security Council 
(including Algeria, China, and Pakistan) expressed reluctance with this wording and it was 
subsequently dropped. Mikael Nabati, ASIL Insights: The U.N. Responds to the Crisis in 
Darfur: Security Council Resolution 1556, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh142.htm (Aug. 
2004). In the wake of Resolution 1556, the Sudanese government agreed to take steps to 
disarm the militias; however, serious attacks continue and the Sudanese government has 
restricted relief flights to the region. Nirna Elbagir, Sudan Launches New Round of Attacks 
in Darfur, Reuters, Aug. 10, 2004; Somini Sengupta, Death and Sorrow Stalk Sudanese 
Across Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at AL 
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Darfur are being subject to genocide, but much less in the way of 
intervention to prevent and protect them from attack.74 
Ill. GROUP SANCTION 
Group sanction can take various forms. Among these, collective 
guilt (or blame) is the starkest. Here, criminal liability is attributed to 
the perpetrator group, whether a state75 or a specific ethnic, racial, 
religious, or political group. Methods of punishment traditional to 
international criminal law, in particular incarceration, would flow from 
this attribution. Since groups and states are not natural persons, 
incarceration would have to be visited upon individuals comprising the 
group or state. For the most part, collective guilt is viewed dubiously,76 
although one scholar, George Fletcher, has made an interesting -
albeit limited - case for it.77 
There are other, less invasive, forms of group sanction. These flow 
not from collective guilt, but rather from a notion of collective liability. 
This category of group sanction would invoke the kinds of remedies 
that ordinary law might mandate in cases of tort or civil delict 
(especially where punitive damages are called for in addition to 
compensatory damages). These include the imposition of economic 
sanctions and trade restrictions on the perpetrator state or 
group,78 embargoes, fines, taxes, coerced international territorial 
administration, and restriction on travel of group members. In this 
regard, the discussion of collective liability I raise here would tend 
more toward the law of state responsibility or countermeasures 
than international criminal law per se. In any event, although 
74. Steven R. Weisman, Powell Says Rapes and Killings in Sudan Are Genocide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A3 (noting the U.S. statement that the Darfur violence is genocide 
but also objections raised by other Security Council members). A United Nations 
Commission of Inquiry concluded that the violence in Darfur amounted to crimes against 
humanity but not to genocide. Frederic L. Kirgis, United Nations Commission 's Report on 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Darfur, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 2005. 
75. As Crawford notes, state criminal liability has "gained very little acceptance, and it 
was deliberately rejected by the ILC [International Law Commission) in its Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)." P. 1 16. 
76. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort 
Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 585 (1997). 
77. George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 163, 168, 169, 173-74 (2004) (positing that collective guilt is a "plausible . . .  and 
sometimes healthy response to collective wrongdoing"). 
78. Since the advent of the Charter of the United Nations, states and international 
organizations have on numerous occasions turned to economic sanctions as an enforcement 
mechanism where a state fails to comply with international law or, more broadly, as a 
method to apply political pressure. Economic sanctions are, therefore, familiar terrain for 
international lawyers. 
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history teaches us that economic sanctions can have devastating 
indiscriminate effects on individuals in targeted countries (effects that 
may be harsher even than penal sanctions), these forms of civil 
liability certainly lack the denunciatory stigma of the criminal law. 
There are also more original ways of thinking about group 
sanction. I offer, as a starting point, a perspective that treats victims as 
individuals and aggressors in the collective (instead of international 
criminal law's current focus on victims in the collective and aggressors 
as individuals). This approach might facilitate the development of 
remedies that stigmatize active and passive involvement in mass 
atrocity but also focus on the need -to restore victims (which is often 
overlooked in criminal law systems aimed at retribution). This model 
would structure group sanction around the notion of collective 
responsibility, which differs from collective guilt, blame, or liability. 
Remedies for collective responsibility recognize that for many victims, 
justice means more than simply the imprisonment of offenders. As 
such, restorative, commemorative, and reparative approaches could 
help operationalize collective responsibility. 
The use of gacaca in Rwanda invokes certain elements of the 
collective responsibility paradigm. Tens of thousands of individuals 
accused of a broad array of crimes during the genocide (ranging from 
intentional homicide to looting) will face gacaca proceedings in which 
they will return to the communities where they allegedly committed 
their crimes to face judgment by the whole community. Although 
gacaca has gotten off to a shaky start, it has the promise to fulfill 
many goals, including advancing managerial concerns, promoting 
atonement, meting out accountability, and overseeing restoration.79 
Among the remedies contemplated by the gacaca proceedings are 
community service, which "may involve rebuilding destroyed schools, 
houses or clinics, maintenance work on buildings, roads or gardens, 
crop cultivation to feed the prison population, educational and 
motivational activities, first aid or personal care. "80 These remedies 
displace the traditional focus on punishment and, in the words of one 
observer, amount to "collective reparations."81 
From Nuremberg to The Hague does not actively discuss these 
novel remedies. In fact, it avoids the thicket of group sanction 
altogether, thereby belying its conceptualization of international 
criminal justice as synonymous with individual criminal trials. Frankly, 
this is not surprising. Conversations about group sanction are 
awkward because of international criminal law's discomfort with 
79. For a detailed discussion of the structure and implementation of gacaca, see Roht­
Arriaza, supra note 21, at 192-95. 
80. Id. at 194. 
81. Id. 
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collective blame, which, in turn, motivates the focus of accountability 
on a relatively small number of high-profile trials. Booth, writing 
within the context of the ICC and citing eminent South African jurist 
Richard Goldstone, echoes this conventional wisdom: 
[P]roceedings before the ICC have the potential of countering the 
attribution of collective responsibility for acts committed by individuals. 
Richard Goldstone put it well when commenting on the emotive 
photographs of the accused in the dock at Nuremberg. He said that 'one 
sees a group of criminals. One does not see a group of representatives of 
the German people - the people who produced Goethe or Heine or 
Beethoven.' (p. 184) 
The point of the matter is that the people who produced Goethe, 
Heine and Beethoven also produced Goebbels, Himmler, and 
Mengele. If Goldstone is to credit the entire German people for 
producing artistic geniuses, why should they be spared responsibility 
for producing mass criminals? The logic of collective exoneration is 
somewhat frail. 
Assuredly, there is a need to accommodate managerial concerns. It 
is proper to suggest that a narrow, individualized criminal law 
paradigm is suitable if truly purposive and broad mechanisms of 
accountability would be too unwieldy and costly. This managerial 
ethic, however, is not the rationale animating criminal trials of a 
handful of perpetrators. That rationale, instead, draws from a belief 
that prosecuting a small number of individuals (generally officials or 
leaders, but not necessarily so) serves a broad range of normative 
goals such as retribution, reconciliation, peace, and narrating history. 
On this latter point, if as Milan Kundera suggested, "the struggle of 
man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting,"82 it 
remains unclear how well individual trials relate historical truths about 
collective violence. Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson 
famously advised that criminal proceedings could be a mechanism 
to "establish incredible events by credible evidence"83 and thereby 
authenticate a historical record. In the case of Nuremberg, trials 
played an important didactic role and helped create a broadly shared 
narrative of Nazi aggression and atrocity. In other cases, like the 
Tokyo Tribunal, there is little evidence that trials accomplished much 
in the way of historical authentication, individual punishment, or 
storytelling. For the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals that currently motor 
the operation of international criminal law, only time will tell. What 
seems odd, though, is that despite the strenuous efforts expended by 
82. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 3 (Michael Henry 
Heim trans., 1986). 
83. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 54 (1992). 
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the ICTY to individualize guilt, there is scant evidence that individual 
Bosnians, Croats, or Serbs blame other individuals for the crimes; 
rather, it seems that they still accord much of the blame on the other 
groups.84 Consequently, it does not appear that individualized 
guilt dissipates the specter of collective blame. These de facto 
realities, in turn, suggest that international lawyers might consider 
de jure methods of accountability that accept the responsibility 
of collectivities. 
Thus far, I have discussed group sanction as a retrospective way to 
effect some justice after atrocity has occurred. But it also is important 
to think about group sanction as a deterrent or preventative 
mechanism. International criminal lawyers tell us that criminal 
punishment can have a deterrent effect, as potential perpetrators 
might restrain themselves from committing extraordinary acts of 
international criminality out of a fear of getting caught and served up 
for prosecution before an international tribunal. Let me argue here 
that group sanctions might serve a more effective deterrent role. 
As we have learned from Rwanda, mass atrocity is not the product 
of random or spontaneous behavior. Rather, it largely is planned, 
deliberate, and orchestrated. Perpetrators often participate because 
they want to or because it is rational for them to do so at the time. 
This rationality can stem from the reality that subordinates stand to 
gain when they follow the orders of their superiors. It also derives 
from the sickening reality that "a large number of people . . .  find war 
and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down."85 There 
also is an emotive or affective component to mass violence. This 
component can be particularly compelling: participants want to be 
part of a collective movement, want that movement to succeed, seek 
the status and privileges of that success, and often believe that they are 
doing good by committing evil. As journalist Robert Kaplan notes, 
"people find liberation in violence."86 
Many leaders of violent movements are what political scientists 
would call conflict entrepreneurs. These are individuals who stand to 
gain economically, socially, and politically from violent conflict. 
Conflict entrepreneurs may deliberately create, exacerbate, inflame, 
or manipulate ethnic, racial, religious, national, or political cleavages 
in order to consolidate their power. One thing we have learned from 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is the pervasiveness of ethnic 
hate propaganda in fuelling the violence in the Balkans and Rwanda. 
Through this demagoguery, conflict entrepreneurs badgered and 
84. David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: 
Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT'L STUD. REV. 355, 368 (2004). 
85. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY 44 (2000). 
86. Id. at 45. 
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brainwashed ordinary citizens to see good in committing violence. 
This faith, together with the dehumanization of the scapegoated 
enemy, makes it much easier for ordinary people to participate in 
communal butchery. Moreover, the death of the enemy often results 
in individual privileges and rewards for the killer (more land, money, 
and goods; promotion in rank; enhanced social status; pride as a 
patriot). In other cases, for example Sierra Leone, the horrible 
internecine violence had little to do with demographic categories.s7 
This violence engulfed civilians in repeat nonideological conflict 
conducted among w arlords, rebels, and government henchmen 
fighting to control lucre, natural resources, or power. At a certain 
point it becomes rational for ordinary citizens to join some side for 
protection and to play the game - after all, if you are on no one's 
side, no one is on yours, and you'll never win. This is how individual 
rationality metastasizes into the tragedy of collective irrationality. 
It is not just genocide that is ordered and derivative of community 
sources. So, too, are international crimes such as terrorism and 
systemic human rights violations such as prisoner abuse. These crimes 
and abuses do not just happen, but instead occur for reasons that 
transcend the individual perpetrator's malevolence. Large-scale 
terrorism, for example, is the product of much more than just the 
behavior of a handful of suicide-bombers. These individuals are 
financed, supported, coddled, and placated by a broader array of 
people and, on occasion, states. An even broader set of actors turns a 
blind eye to them. There is a continuum of responsibility at play. The 
difficult questions are whether law can thwart the continuum and, if 
so, how? Clearly, it is problematic to assume that law can deter those 
who would kill themselves in order to kill others. But without broader 
support, whether it be direct, indirect, passive, or acquiescent, these 
individuals would not pose the danger that they do. It is to this 
phenomenon that law should focus its attention. International criminal 
law as presently constituted, however, seems unable, or unwilling, to 
do so. 
Moreover, as philosopher Michael Ignatieff observes, systemic 
human rights abuses can be perpetrated by anyone in the name of any 
side to a conflict.ss The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, 
deliberately contoured to include sexual humiliation, reveals that no 
one is immune.s9 In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, familiar tensions 
87. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 150 (2004). 
88. MICHAEL lGNA TJEFF, THE LESSER EVIL 1 15, 1 18 (2004). 
89. Scott Higham and Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, 
May 21, 2004, at Al (reporting investigations of allegations at Abu Ghraib of savage 
beatings, prisoners being forced to retrieve food from toilets, sexual molestation, force-
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emerge: the easy answer (let's punish a handful of perverted, abusive 
individual perpetrators for their independent actions), on the one 
hand, and more discomfiting questions (did these individual guards act 
because they were ordered, encouraged, or permitted to do so by 
more senior commanders?;90 or because the chain of command was 
muddied among military and civilian-corporate superiors?;91 or 
because they grotesquely exaggerated perceived cues from high-level 
policy decisions to minimize the role of law in the name of national 
security?) on the other.92 The role of law in accounting for Abu 
feeding of pork and liquor to Muslim prisoners, forcing prisoners to bark like dogs, riding 
prisoners like animals, forced masturbation, rape, and sodomy). 
90. See Bradley Graham & Josh White, Top Pentagon Leaders Faulted in Prison Abuse, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al (reporting that an independent panel concluded that top 
Pentagon civilian and military leaders, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, failed to 
exercise adequate oversight and allowed conditions that led to the abuse of detainees in 
Iraq); Thom Shanker & Kate Zernike, Abuse Inquiry Faults Officers on Leadership, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (reporting that a high-level Army inquiry found that, although 
there was no evidence of direct culpability above the colonel who commanded the military 
intelligence unit of the Abu Ghraib prison, senior U.S. commanders created conditions that 
allowed abuses to occur); Frederick Gets 8 Years in Iraq Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2004 (reporting on the sentencing of a staff sergeant for abuse at Abu Ghraib and on the 
sergeant's insisting that the chain of command forced prisoners to submit to degrading 
treatment for military intelligence purposes). The defense of "following orders" has largely 
been rejected in the Abu Ghraib prosecutions. That said, there is evidence that some 
interrogators believed they were following orders. Editorial, War Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 
23, 2004, at A22 (discussing in particular Guantanamo). 
91. See Arianna Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between 
Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al. 
92. Administration lawyers had advised that the President was not bound by an 
international treaty prohibiting torture or by federal antitorture legislation because of his 
authority as Commander in Chief to approve any technique needed to protect U.S. security 
and, furthermore, that any executive branch officials (including those in the military) could 
be immune from domestic and international prohibitions against torture. Working Group 
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, 
Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 21 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ military_0604.pdf. The Working Group 
Report also provided tightly constructed definitions of torture, concluding that an 
interrogator who knows that severe pain will result from his actions lacks the requisite 
specific intent to torture even if he acted in bad faith so long as causing this pain was not his 
objective. Id at 8-12. The Working Group Report drew heavily from an August 1, 2002 
memorandum signed by former Assistant Attorney-General Jay Bybee (currently a judge on 
the Ninth Circuit) that argued that the President's wartime powers superseded anti-torture 
laws and treaties. Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture "May be Justified", WASH. 
POST, June 13, 2004. This memorandum, in turn, derives from several earlier memoranda, 
including one authored by John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. 
Delahunty, Special Counsel, from the Office of Legal Counsel (Department of Justice) to 
the Department of Defense. Memorandum, Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek. 
The August 1, 2002 memorandum generated considerable criticism insofar as it appeared to 
justify the use of torture (stopping just short of death) in the war on terror and to immunize 
personnel committing torture from legal process. Id. As a consequence of this controversy, 
and nearly two years after the memorandum was initially authored, the Department of 
Justice disavowed it. David Johnston, Uncertainty About Interrogation Rules Seen as Slowing 
the Hunt for Information on Terrorists, N.Y. nMES, June 28, 2004, at Al. On December 30, 
2004, a new memorandum was issued that superseded the one that had been disavowed. 
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Ghraib, in which some of the abuses amount to the kinds of 
infringements of the Geneva Conventions that would be criminalized 
as war crimes, is a microcosm of a number of much broader questions. 
Does individual liability for the perpetrator suffice? Does this 
individual liability make life easier for the rest of us, since we can 
blame the abuse on a select small group of twisted individuals on the 
nightshift? Does their defense - that they were following orders -
make us uncomfortable? What about an even bigger picture: namely, 
that the behavior at Abu Ghraib may be nothing more than a mutated 
form of our own suspicion of law in allaying our fears of terror? 
Guantanamo - isolated, shorn of process, access, and transparency -
sits as another stark metaphor of the perceptions among certain 
influential actors of the crimped role law should play in the war on 
terror93 and, in turn, a site of contestation for other important actors, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts.94 
There is an incredible distance between abuse in hors-la-Loi prisons 
in Baghdad and the automaticity of mass violence. The point, though, 
is that for both ends of the continuum, as with many examples of 
troubling human behavior, structural factors can be controlled and 
incentivized to discourage individuals from acting in a manner that 
Memorandum for James B. Corney, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, acting 
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 30, 2004). 
This memorandum flatly states that torture violates U.S. and international law and omits the 
position that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, could supersede U.S. anti-torture laws, 
that U.S. personnel could assert a number of defenses to torture, and the narrow definitions 
of torture (namely, that torture had to involve pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, 
or even death"). Id. at 2. However, in December 2004, merely a couple of weeks before 
public release of the new memo but well after the disavowal of the August 2002 memo, a 
Justice Department lawyer instructed a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that "it would 
not be illegal to torture detainees to obtain statements about them." Carol D. Leonnig & 
Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New Details and Disputes, WASH. POST, Dec. 11 ,  2004, 
at Al. 
93. Goldstone, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
94. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction 
to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in 
connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay). Following the Rasul 
decision, Combatant Status Review Tribunals were introduced at Guantanamo to determine 
the status of detainees. Detainees are entitled to a personal representative before these 
tribunals but the representative is not a lawyer nor is the relationship between detainee and 
representative one of privilege. Combatant Status Review Tribunals have been challenged in 
federal court; one district court judge has found them to be unconstitutional owing to their 
infringement of due process under the Fifth Amendment. In re Guantanamo Detainee 
Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236 (D.D.C., Jan. 31,  2005). Moreover, a small number of 
Guantanamo detainees face prosecution in military commissions for war crimes. Scott 
Higham, Bin Laden Aide ls Charged at First Tribunal, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al. 
The military commission proceedings have been mired in controversy and delay. Neil A. 
Lewis, Guantanamo Tribunal Process in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at A31. They, 
too, face challenge in federal court. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 
2004). 
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may seem wholly repugnant after the fact but may well have been 
eminently rational at the time. Assuredly, this is a controversial 
suggestion. These thoughts are the beginnings of a more difficult 
process of discussion and deliberation that transcends the content of 
From Nuremberg to The Hague. 
According to social norm theorists, group sanctions can succeed 
insofar as group members are in an advantageous position to identify 
and monitor the behavior of conflict entrepreneurs.95 Since the 
criminal law currently does not reach acquiescent group members, it 
provides them scant incentive to cabin the behavior of conflict 
entrepreneurs or control their own reactions thereto. Group members 
therefore become unaccountable beneficiaries of the violence instead 
of potential gatekeepers. The threat of collective sanctions, on the 
other hand, may motivate group members to marginalize the conduct 
of conflict entrepreneurs or, even, snuff it out early on. Moreover, 
collective sanction does not have to be limited to perpetrator group 
members. Would international institutions and foreign states have 
responded with the same nonfeasance to genocide in Rwanda were 
they to be subject to the reach of collective sanctions? 
My point here is that if all ordinary folks somehow would be held 
responsible for the carnage perpetrated in situations of mass violence, 
some of the major conditions precedent to such violence - namely 
the silence of the majority, the complicity of the bystander, and the 
inaction of the international community - might well dissipate. If 
average citizens believed they might be much worse off if they 
followed the exhortations of conflict entrepreneurs, then fewer would 
follow, and some might even discredit these entrepreneurs early 
enough in the game to preclude them from gaining momentum. 
Individuals tempted by violence might well change course. On the 
other hand, since passive acquiescence rarely - if ever - is 
implicated in a system based exclusively on individualized criminal 
justice, it is unclear how this system can deter this fundamental 
prerequisite to mass atrocity. 
IV. JUSTICE, ACCESSIBILITY, AND EMPOWERMENT 
Cherie Booth's contribution to From Nuremberg to The Hague 
calls for the active involvement of women in the ICC (p. 163).96 For 
Booth, gender diversity among ICC jurists is essential to the ICC's 
legitimacy. While I share this sentiment, it is helpful to view issues of 
diversity and accessibility in a more subtle manner. Which women, 
exactly, should sit on the ICC bench? Does this include women from 
95. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003). 
96. See also Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 36(8)(a)(iii) (requiring that there be fair 
representation of female and male judges). 
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postconflict societies? Or, on the other hand, shall the ICC continue 
the practice of ethnic neutrality adopted by the ICTR and ICTY, 
where members of victim and aggressor communities are deliberately 
excluded from the institution's personnel in the name of impartiality? 
Booth's argument may propound gender diversity while 
perpetuating the dominance of elite legal technocrats at the expense 
of the hard work required to integrate local communities and local 
women in the adjudicative process. I certainly do not deny that the 
involvement of women jurists at the ICTR and ICTY has influenced 
the progressive development of international criminal law, for 
example when it comes to proscribing sexual violence. Booth 
grippingly documents how the presence of Judge Navanethem Pillay 
- "a South African Indian, and the only female judge on the 
Rwandan Tribunal at the time" (p. 168) - on the bench during the 
prosecution of Jean-Paul Akayesu (a local mayor accused of 
involvement in the Rwandan genocide) was instrumental in allowing 
testimony of sexual violence to be adduced and in turn utilized by the 
Prosecution in successfully pursuing charges of genocide and rape as a 
crime against humanity (pp. 167-71). Booth is correct to link the 
existence of gender diversity among international jurists and 
prosecutors to the expanding criminalization of sexual violence against 
women.97 Even if the retributive and deterrent value of this 
criminalization might be called into question, the expressive value of 
making such conduct firmly and flatly illegal has tremendously 
positive implications in the struggle toward gender equality. That 
alone, however, is not enough; for the law truly to be purposive, it 
must welcome - to borrow from Derek Bell - "the faces at the 
bottom of the well"98 so that they can assert ownership over their own 
trauma and articulate their own response. International criminal law 
will induce a democratic deficit for so long as it does not include, in 
the process of accountability, the voices of those actually afflicted 
by the violence.99 It also may thereby replicate patterns of 
97. Pp. 165-67. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T (ICTY Trial 
Chamber, Feb. 22, 2001), affd, Case No. IT-96-23-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, June 12, 
2002); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, Dec. 10, 
1998). 
98. DEREK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1993). 
99. Concerns over democratic defects and operational pluralism are not limited to 
international criminal law. See, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam, Saving the Tortoise, the Turtle, and 
the Terrapin: The Hegemony of Global Environmentalism and the Marginalization of Third 
World Approaches to Sustainable Development, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER 15 
(Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Obijiofor Aginam eds., 2003) (arguing that international 
environmental law has failed to take into account those practices and belief systems of the 
countries of the South that are relevant to sustainable development). 
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political dominance that characterize the international socio-legal 
order generally. 
In this vein, Sands discusses the role of national courts in the 
adjudication of international crimes. He does not explore the potential 
of local or indigenous justice mechanisms that, in many places, may 
carry greater legitimacy among the general population. Sands believes 
that there is an important role for national courts in the process of 
accountability (pp. 70-71, 81). I share this sentiment. That said, 
international lawyers must recognize that the national justice systems 
of conflict states may have little credibility due to their misuse as tools 
of repression during periods of authoritarian rule. What is more, 
Sands appears less amenable to a pluralistic definition of how those 
national or local institutions should proceed. His frame of reference 
essentially is one where proceeding nationally implies subsidiary 
implementation of the modalities of international criminal trials 
which, in turn, means the superimposition of the dominant criminal 
law methodologies of those states that dominate the world-order. 
Instead, those contemplating the future of international criminal 
justice may consider looking at alternative mechanisms, such as 
those that draw from restorative justice, local custom, or indigenous 
legal process. 
By "national" courts, international lawyers actually mean two 
distinct types of courts: (1) those of the place where the international 
crimes occurred (discussed in the previous paragraph); and (2) those 
in other places. Sands unpacks the role of national courts in other 
places. These courts - invoking principles of universal jurisdiction -
in certain narrow cases may assert jurisdiction over foreign 
perpetrators of systematic human rights abuses against foreign 
nationals (pp. 89-102). Sands explores this phenomenon through a 
case study of the litigation initiated in Spain against General Pinochet 
of Chile, which led to a decision by the House of Lords permitting 
Pinochet's extradition to Spain from the U.K. (where he had been 
detained after entering the U.K. for medical treatment). Sands also 
discusses the 2002 opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
concerning a dispute between Belgium and the Congo regarding the 
legality of an arrest warrant of a Congolese government minister. In 
this case, the ICJ invoked the doctrine of official immunities under 
customary international law to limit the reach of foreign national 
courts over human rights abusers who were official heads of state or 
ministers at the time the abuses are alleged to have taken place.100 
100. Under customary international law, official immunities can serve as a defense to 
charges of international crimes. This defense, however, has been narrowed and, in certain 
cases, eliminated by the statutes of international courts such as the ICC, ICIY, and ICTR, 
and internationalized domestic courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Rome 
Statute, supra note 16, art. 27; Statute of the ICIY, supra note 18, art. 7(2); Statute of the 
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Sands's comments are generally supportive of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction as a mechanism to secure justice.101 For a variety of good 
reasons, he is critical of the ICJ decision (p. 108). Sands does not 
address concerns, however, with universal jurisdiction that transcend 
tired political realist arguments. One important concern is that judicial 
verdicts delivered by far-away courts may have little meaning among 
populations affected by the violence. Furthermore, Belgium's 
assertions of universal jurisdiction present a double-edged sword 
insofar as Belgium's colonial abuses in the Congo and Rwanda 
(Belgian courts have convicted Rwandans for genocide) intimately tie 
it to the violence. This, in tum, problematizes the ex post intervention 
of Belgian courts in the name of human rights. Involving national 
courts in the process of adjudicating extraordinary crimes should 
implicate, first and foremost, the legitimate courts of the place affected 
by the violence, not foreign national courts embarking on messianic 
enforcement of human rights while ignoring their own responsibility 
for the decay of those same rights. Of course, there are cases where 
the national (or local) courts of the place where the violations took 
place are closed to any claims because the authoritarian abusers are 
still in office. In such situations, I would argue that proceeding through 
an international institution such as the ICC - notwithstanding its 
shortcomings - is preferable to proceeding through a distant foreign 
national court. 
Various contributors to From Nuremberg to The Hague examine 
the doctrine of complementarity, which is the principle guiding the 
interplay of the ICC with national courts (pp. 63-65, 74-81). According 
to this principle, the ICC only will assert jurisdiction over a case when 
it decides that national courts are unwilling or unable genuinely to 
investigate or prosecute.102 The complementarity mechanism of the 
ICC is much more nuanced than the brusque primacy given the ICTY 
and ICTR over all national proceedings. For Sands, the principle of 
complementarity means that "the ICC will play a residual role" (p. 
75). As I see it, however, the ICC's role may be residual in form but 
not in substance. National institutions in post-conflict societies may 
feel inclined to adopt procedures that look much like those at the 
ICTR, supra note 17, art. 6(2); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 19, 
art. 6(2). 
101. Moreover, Sands has intervened as amicus curiae in litigation before the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone in favor of the argument that an international court may exercise 
jurisdiction over a serving head of state and that this head of state may not claim immunity 
under customary international law in respect of international crimes. Prosecutor v. Charles 
Taylor (SCSL, No. 2003-01-I), Submission of the Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/Sands.pdf. 
102. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 17. 
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ICC to minimize the risk of ceding jurisdiction to the ICC. After all, 
it is a safe bet that, for an ICC judge, a "genuine" prosecution will 
be one that approximates the method employed by the ICC. 
Complementarity, therefore, may encourage heterogeneity in terms 
of the number of institutions adjudicating international crimes, 
but homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the 
punishment they inflict. This does not give much of a chance to 
those legal processes that deviate from the dominant methodology 
of international criminal law, regardless of the legitimacy, 
scrupulousness, or connectivity of those local processes. 
CONCLUSION 
Most international lawyers are very proud of the new institutions 
of international criminal law. Certainly, there is much cause for that 
pride. These institutions are the product of hard work in the face of 
seemingly intransigent political gridlock. With this pride, however, 
understandably comes some defensiveness. This leads to a situation 
where the critic of international criminal law institutions often is 
viewed with considerable reserve. Part of the problem is that 
criticizing international criminal law institutions often puts the critic, 
no matter how well-intentioned, in the company of those who believe 
such institutions to be scurrilous or actually detrimental to national 
security interests.103 This mode of political realism, which expresses 
considerable reserve regarding the legalization of international 
relations and the judicialization of politics, has proven influential to 
many governments, including that of the United States, when faced 
with the prospect of mass violence perpetrated by non-state-actor 
terrorists. There has been a resurgence of cynicism about the role of 
law in international affairs. In this regard I must agree with Booth, 
who distinguishes modesty about the potential of international 
criminal justice from cynicism (p. 177). 
This cynicism sees law as something that stands in the way of 
combating security threats, thereby leading to a constriction of law. 
One example is the conscious decision by the U.S. to categorize 
terrorist attacks as armed attacks instead of criminal attacks, but then 
view international humanitarian law - which customarily governs the 
conduct of belligerents in armed conflict - as "quaint" and something 
to be circumscribed in conducting the war on terror.104 This has given 
103. GEORGE F. KENNAN, DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD (1951); HENRY 
KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (2001). 
104. Alberto Gonzales, Memorandum to the President, Decision Re Application of the 
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
(January 25, 2002) (document on file with the author). See also Neil A. Lewis & Eric 
Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn 't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at 
May 2005] Pluralizing International Criminal Justice 1327 
rise to Guantanamo, as discussed previously, along with a much 
broader array of policies, practices, and contestations.105 
Paradoxically, perhaps, Overy's contribution to From Nuremberg 
to The Hague teaches us about the dynamic role played by the United 
States, in particular Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President 
Truman, in establishing the Nuremberg tribunal at a time when British 
leaders would have preferred to "subject enemy leaders to a quick 
despatch before a firing squad" (pp. 3-4). Similarly, the United States 
has been an advocate of ad hoc tribunals judging international crimes 
in places as diverse as Rwanda, Cambodia, and the former 
Yugoslavia.106 It supports a transparent legal process for Saddam 
Hussein and his cronies.107 The idea that due process, law, and public 
trials are necessary for the perpetrators of unspeakable violence, 
Al (concluding that after the September 1 1  terrorist attacks the administration's lawyers 
"were set to work to find legal arguments to avoid restrictions imposed by international and 
American law"); Edward Alden, Dismay at legal justifications for torture, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(LONDON), June 10, 2004, at 7 (reporting that the memoranda regarding torture of terrorist 
suspects take "some extreme positions" wholly inconsistent with settled law). 
105. For example, the White House has claimed that it has the unilateral ability to 
declare a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then deny that individual access to any form 
of legal process to contest the indefinite detention that might result. Anthony Lewis, A 
President Beyond the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A31 .  This has been challenged by 
the judicial branch. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due 
process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker); see also Adam Liptak, For Post-9111 Material Witness, It Is a Terror of a 
Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (reporting on aggressive use of material 
witness warrants by U.S. prosecutors to detain those believed to have knowledge of terrorist 
activities); supra note 90 (discussing torture memoranda). Another example involves the 
accountability of the executive branch. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the 
White House that declaring Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees were not covered by the 
Geneva Conventions "substantially reduces" the threat of criminal prosecution for war 
crimes (defined to include any grave breach of the Geneva Conventions) under domestic 
U.S. law. Gonzales, supra note 104; John Barry, Michael Hirsh, & Michael Isikoff, The Roots 
of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/498948; see also 
Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, available 
at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/ (reporting that "the internal memos 
show that administration lawyers were privately concerned that they could be tied for war 
crimes themselves based on actions the administration [was] taking"). Secretary of State 
Colin Powell submitted a sharp critique of this recommendation. Colin L. Powell, 
Memorandum for Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President 
on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (January 26, 
2002) (document on file with the author). The President followed suit by stating that Taliban 
detainees were entitled to the coverage of the Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda 
fighters were not; however, he then denied actual prisoner of war status to all detainees. 
Katherine Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al; Paul 
Koring, No PoWs Being Held in Cuba, Bush Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 8, 2002, 
at A12. 
106. Landsman, supra note 7, at 1582. 
107. Although it is important to remember that prior to the March 2003 conflict, the 
United States offered Saddam Hussein amnesty if he abandoned power. 
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however, has lost luster among U.S. governing elites when U.S. 
citizens are affected by that violence. This diminishing prioritization 
has acquired an additional outlet in the form of American 
exemptionalism from international conventions in the war on terror, 
and, in Crawford's words, "the unhappy and extravagant opposition" 
of the United States to the ICC (p. 109).108 
The purpose of my critique of international criminal law is not to 
constrict law. Abandoning law frightens me more than naively 
venerating legalism. My intent in this Review is, instead, to affirm the 
importance of law in the process of international cooperation and to 
underscore law's potential for stigmatizing enemies of humanity and 
remembering their victims. The only way for international criminal 
law effectively to grow in this direction is through a sustained process 
of critique and reflection. From Nuremberg to The Hague is a valuable 
step in this direction. It praises extant methods, but realizes that they 
still disappoint. It then draws strength by viewing disappointment as a 
prerequisite for improvement. From Nuremberg to The Hague also 
carries this debate to a broader nonspecialist audience, thereby 
serving a catalytic pedagogical function. I hope to continue this debate 
through this Review by suggesting that further restructuring of extant 
thinking is required in order for international criminal law truly 
to be transformative. 
108. On the relationship between the United States and the ICC, see Sands and Booth, 
pp 76-77, 187-91. Booth's hope that the United States would remain within the ICC 
framework was dashed in April 2002 when President Bush announced the United States 
would in fact unsign the Rome Statute. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM '9-11' TO THE 
IRAQ WAR 2003 88 (2004) (adding that the legal effect of the decision to unsign "release[ed] 
the US from any obligation not to act inconsistently with the object and purpose of the ICC 
Statute"). 
